Relatório da Comissão do Caso Lokanath Swami, 1º de março de 2022 (pareceres da maioria e da minoria; apêndices publicados separadamente)

Report of the Lokanath Swami
         Case Panel

                                       Table of Contents
          Factual Background.............c        cece cece cece eee eee eee eee e ene e eee n entre rene nn bene ee 2
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          Procedural History ............ 00. cece            cece     eee ee nena         enna caer enna ee eet ae 6
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           0) | Cer 10) CoosBr ree 16
          Discussion — Majority ......... 00... cece cece cece e nee        eee e eee nee ease ee en eeeeeneeseeneneeens 22
          Minority Concurrence ........ 0... cc eee csessecnseneeeserecneseeneesecneeseceeeesseseesceesetesasesenrs AD
          Conclusion — Majority ........ 0...           cece cece eee eee e ee re renee ee eee e teense ee enge 48
          Discussion — MinOrity.......0.        0.6.0 cece eee e cece eee   e cece eee ee eee en ee eaeesenseen esas enegs 52
          Conclusion and Recommendation — Minority ............
                                                      00.0: cee cee eee ec ee cee e eee en scenes 66

         Report of the Lokanath Swami Case Panel
                                   March 1 2022

This Panel was constituted by the GBC Body in September 2021 for,
inter alia, the following purposes:


  e   Establish a shared baseline of facts and evidence regarding this

      case.


  e   Assess and review the facts and evaluate the evidence of the case.

  e   Assess     and    review     the   manner    in    which   the _ previous

      investigations and adjudications of this case were handled by the

      GBC, including but not limited, to whether the GBC erred, or

      otherwise,       in   such     handling     and,    accordingly,   make

      recommendations on the appropriate action that could be taken.

  e   Assess and review the sanctions on Lokanath Swami, including,

      but not limited, the basis of sanctions, taking into consideration

      expert legal opinions and principled decision making, and the

      extent these sanctions were complied with.

  e   Present its findings and make recommendations on the above to

      the GBC.


We report as follows:

   I. Factual Background!


      Soon after breaking his right leg during a sankirtana procession in


Navadvipa in early 1990, Lokanath Swami flew to the US to help


organize and inspire Padayatra America, beginning in Philadelphia. He


first stayed at the local ISKCON temple, but his room was located on an


upper floor and it was difficult for him to negotiate the stairs with his


injury. Seeing this, a devotee from the congregation, iii

fs invited Lokanath Swami to come and stay in his home in

nearby New Jersey. Lokanath Swami agreed and remained there for a


week in April, accompanied by his assistant, Radha Raman Swami (at


the time still a brahmachari). Mr. requested Lokanath Swami

to train and impart Indian culture to his youngest daughter, Satya, who


was eleven and a half years old at the time.


      On a couple occasions, Lokanath Swami gave harmonium lessons


to Satya. They sat right next to each other, and when Satya would play




'The main text of this section relays undisputed baseline facts. Regarding
additional details for which there are different versions, either internal to one party
or between the two parties, the reader is referred to notes at the end of the section.
Moreover, because the Panel is evaluating the prior decisions and not coming to a
new decision itself, those notes only present versions of events that were presented
in 2012 or earlier. (See section on new evidence near the end of the report for
discussion of evidence submitted after that time.)
                                         ~D~

nicely, he would touch her on the leg and say, “Very good.” [See Note


1.]


      Sometime afterward, Lokanath Swami had Satya read aloud from


a hardbound one-volume edition of Krishna book. They were seated


next to each other on a couch, and he was supporting the book with both


hands. Her mother was cooking in the adjoining kitchen [See Note 2],


and his servant was also in the house. They read for between half an


hour and an hour, during which time he would occasionally lower one


hand and rest the back of it on some part of Satya’s leg while he


continued to support the book. At some point during the reading, the


back of his hand came in contact with Satya’s body (over her clothing) in


the upper thigh or crotch area [See Note 3] and remained there


motionless for some time. [See Note 4.] She reacted in a way that made


him aware that something untoward had occurred, but she did not


touch or push his hand aside. [See Note 5.] The reading then


continued.


      One time, Lokanath Swami noticed that Satya was still wearing


her nightdress late in the morning. After she became aware that he had


spotted her, she ran away because she was embarrassed. He followed


                                  ~Q~

her, made her come out of hiding, and then patted her on the butt,


telling her to “Go and take your shower.” [See Note 6.]




Additional Details:


Key to the sources for the information below :

   e   “Satya 1993” is her interview by Yasoda Devi (Appendix A);
   e   “Satya 2010” is her Facebook post (Appendix B);
   e   “Satya all’ is used when both “Satya 1993” and “Satya 2010” are in essential
       agreement.
   e   “LOK 1993” is Badrinarayan Swami’s documentation of Lokanath Swami’s
       testimony to the original 1993 Committee. (Appendix C)
   e   “LOK letter (original)” is Lokanath Swami’s original draft of his 2010 apology
       letter that was sent on his behalf by an assistant via email. (Appendix D)
   e   “LOK letter (his edits 1)” is one iteration of Lokanath Swami’s revisions to his
       original 2010 apology letter that were sent on his behalf by an assistant via
       email. (Appendix E)
   e   “LOK letter (his edits 2)” is another iteration of Lokanath Swami’s revisions
       to his original 2010 apology letter that were sent on his behalf by an
       assistant via email. (Appendix F)
   e   “LOK GBC Oct 2011” is the notes from the Mid-Term Meeting of the GBC
       that date. (Appendix G)
   e   “LOK all’ is used when all the various LOK documents are in essential
       agreement.

Note 1: What was the nature of the touch?


Satya all: The touch was a rub.
Satya 2010: The touch went “up and down my leg, inner leg, and out.”
LOK all: The touch was a pat.


Note 2: Who else was in the room?


Satya 1993: “The kitchen is back, you know, where my mother was. She was the
only one. And upstairs was his disciple, so it was just me and him in the room.”
Satya 2010: “... any time my mother would walk by the room, he would quickly
remove his hand and place it above my head (around me). He did this several times
throughout the course of an hour.”

LOK 1993: “When things were already normalizing, my servant came and sat close
to us, listening to the Krsna Book reading.”
LOK letter (his edits 2): “My servant was going in and out of the room and
Satya's mother, who was cooking in the adjoining kitchen, was also walking by the
room.”



Note 3: What part of her body did he touch?


Satya 1993: She refers to the area touched as “my private area” and her mom
reports that Satya said it was her “secret part.”
Satya 2010: She says it was “my crotch not on my lap.”
LOK 1993: “My hand landed on her thigh, and it very gently moved across her
thigh a few times. This is where my hand spent most of the time. Then, it moved
towards the upper thigh, including the private area.”
LOK letter (his edits 1): “[M]y hand touched her thigh and moved across between
the knee and upper thigh over her clothing several times. In the upper thigh region
while my hand was moving, I sensed my hand touched her private part.”
LOK GBC Oct 2011:
Badri: whatever gbe decides, let it be decided on fact. I am very pained to be in this
situation. Lok is saintly, it is not pleasant to say this, we have repeatedly been put
in this position. I hope I never have to repeat. Here is what happened: lok told me at
the time, sesa was not present at the time, many facts have been edited out from
both sides, we have danced around the issue. Here is what happened. I hate saying
this.


Lok was sitting on the couch with this could, took his hand, felt her vagina, he
moved his hand back after she moved it away, and felt her out as they say, he
admitted he was overcome by lusty desires, that’s what he told me.
That is the core event.




Lok: what I confessed or disclosed in 93, some are here, bkg and some others, it
happened in san diego. I don’t know if you were on the team or privately. I am not
going back on what you described. It was not written down in 1993. That was the
subcommittees decision. ... Same subcommittee of 93 wrote a report. Then because
that paper of 97 was to be shown to disciples, I was doing some negotiation, but I
was standing by what I had stated. Rvsd was the author, he interviewed me, others’
input was there and the subcommittee was released. The facts did not change but
on paper it was not mentioned what part was touched, just mentions upper thigh.


Note 4: How long did the touch last?

Satya 1993: “So I finally, you know, said, I can hold this myself. And he just....” /
“So I finally got the courage to say, ‘I can hold this myself.’ And he just smiled and
he said, ‘Yes, okay, read, keep reading.”
Satya 2010: “And after that sick feeling inside me became the most prominent
thing for me, I told him I was tired, and I left the room.”
LOK 1993: “My hand was there for not more than a couple of minutes, once or
twice.”


Note 5: Was the touch deliberate?


Satya 1993: “And second of all, you know, he should have kept his hands to
himself.”
Satya 2010: “I am keeping the book from touching you there, so just keep reading.”
/ “.., any time my mother would walk by the room, he would quickly remove his
hand and place it above my head (around me). He did this several times throughout
the course of an hour.”
LOK 1993: “The hand withdrawal took place as the girl interrupted her reading
and looked at me a few times. This is when the feelings of shame and guilt emerged
in me. | tried to overcome the attack, by fighting it back with my spiritual strength
and prayers.”
LOK letter (original):


“When I found myself put into close association with Satya, some feelings
unexpectedly arose, but this experience was new to me and I did not know exactly
how to acknowledge them or cope with them. I yielded, momentarily, to impulse,
and acted in an inappropriate manner.”


“My transgressions were not consciously planned. They were accidental mistakes
for me in very unusual circumstances.”


Note 6: What was the extent of the touching?


Satya all: He “hit me on the butt” once after pulling her out of a closet.
Satya 2010: He “patted me on the butt” once before she ran away and again
“touched me on my butt” after, at which time he also "held my hands and put his
arms around me.”


   Il.      Procedural History

      A. Initial decision


            1. Process followed

     Satya first made allegations against Lokanath Swami in 1998.


After receiving her complaint, Virabahu Dasa, the GBC Chairman for


1993-94, appointed a seven-member committee (“the Committee”) to


meet with Lokanath Swami, consisting of himself, Bir Krishna


Goswami, Badrinarayan Dasa, Mukunda Goswami, Sridhar Swami,


Madhusevita Dasa, and Ravindra Svarupa Dasa. They immediately


suspended Lokanath Swami from initiating further disciples and


restricted his movements while they undertook a complete


investigation.


     The Committee arranged for Satya to be interviewed on June 8,


first by Saudamani Devi Dasi, wife of the Philadelphia temple


president, Ravindra Svarupa Dasa, and then by Yasoda Devi Dasi, a


licensed clinical social worker. (Appendix A)


     Later that month, the Committee sent Lokanath Swami to Child


Abuse Prevention Behaviour Associates, Inc. (“the CAP team”), a group


of mental health professionals specializing in evaluating and treating


clergy from a variety of religious traditions who had been implicated in


child molestation. The CAP team was given a victim report written by

Yasoda Devi and was paid $2,500 to perform a two-day assessment on


Lokanath Swami.


     After the evaluation was completed, the CAP team met personally


with some members of the committee, explained their findings, and


answered questions.


     All of these proceedings were kept confidential. In response to


later rumors, however, Bir Krishna Goswami informed the entire GBC


body via email in 1997 of the basics of the allegations and the actions


taken in response. (Appendix H) In March 1999, an official statement


written by Ravindra Svarupa Dasa was published more broadly


(“Information Release”). (Appendix I)


        2. Decision made


     The CAP team made the following findings:


        a. Lokanath Swami is not a pedophile. He presents no danger
           to children.


        b. Although the girl was young, she had begun the transition to
           womanhood, and Lokanath Swami did not sexually relate to
           her presence as that of a child.


        c. Lokanath Swami had been brought up in a way that kept
           him entirely innocent of the experience of sexuality. He had
           not undergone the normal (or, at any rate, western)
           adolescent struggle of coming to grips with sexuality and
           sexual feelings. Thus, when he found himself put into close

                                   ~Ss~

            association with this young girl, some sexual feelings
            unexpectedly arose, but these feelings were new to him, and
            he did not know exactly how to acknowledge them or cope
            with them. The normal, reflexive restraints and inhibitions
            that experience would have established in him were not in
            place, and he yielded, momentarily, to impulse, and thus
            acted in a transgressive manner.



        d. Certain circumstances conspired to disassociate Lokanath
            Swami from his usual sense of himself and his normal
            behavior and to make him unusually vulnerable. First, his
            leg was broken, a serious disability for one's [sic] whose
            main service and raison d'etre was Padayatra, walking.
            Second, his immobility confined him for a prolonged period
            to an unfamiliar domestic atmosphere, full with family
            interactions and emotions. Third, the strong desire of the
            father for Lokanath Swami to administer discipline and
            instruction to the girl also drove him into closer association
            with a female than he would ordinarily venture [sic].


        e. The episodes offensive to the girl were therefore anomalous,
           brought about by a highly "unusual concatenation of
            circumstances." They arose fortuitously, and with a
            minimum of precautions, such occasions should be easy to
            avoid in the future.


       f.   Lokanath Swami’s entire identity and sense of self is built
            upon his role as a religious leader, and it is a role to which
            his personality is exceptionally well-suited. Given the unique
            conditions that prompted the episodes and given the fact
            that there is no reason to expect such episodes to occur
            again, Lokanath Swami should remain in his role as a
            religious leader. (However, this does not negate the girl [sic]
            legitimate feelings of violation and abuse.)


Accordingly, the CAP team concluded:


                                    ~Q~

      Thus, given the above detailed character and personality
      analyses we do not believe that Swami Lokanath suffers from
      any paraphiliac condition and does not pose a danger of overt
      sexual violence toward women and children. These findings do
      not negate the fact that he acted in a clearly inappropriate
      manner or that the girl who was a recipient of these acts may
      have experienced many traumatic sequelae common to victims of
      sexual abuse.


      We believe that Lokanath's actions were not consciously planned
      but resulted from his own lack of any experience of the intimacy
      and/or sexuality and the internalized awareness of boundaries
      which such experiences provide. This dearth of experiential
      knowledge would have been compensated had Lokanath adhered
      strictly to the tenets of his religious beliefs about the proper
      boundaries to be observed by males with a females. However,
      Lokanath found himself in a very unique setting which evoked
      feelings of early family ties coupled with feelings of vulnerability
      due to his physical limitations and took him briefly out of his
      usual sense of himself as defined by his religious persona. In
      order to best assure that such a set of circumstances could not
      reoccur we strongly suggest that Swami Lokanath not allow
      himself to be alone with a woman or child, that he continue his
      religious works of service as they are absolutely necessary for
      maintenance of a healthy sense of himself in the world, that he
      not spend more than one day/night with any one family while
      travelling, and that he seek the on--going support of his
      colleagues via communications with him during his travels.?


Having received this evaluation and reviewed the notes from Satya’s


interview, the Committee concluded:


      Lokanath Swami’s fault quite exactly exemplified what Srila
      Prabhupada termed an ‘accidental’ mistake (B.G. 9.30-31).

2 Unfortunately, the Panel was unable to obtain an original copy of the CAP report.
But its contents were reproduced in the Information Release and no one to date has
contested the accuracy of those representations.

     Lokanath Swami’s transgression was not planned or
     premeditated. It was, to use Prabhupada’s terminology,
     unconscious, not wilful [sic], unknowing. (See for example,
     the conversation of May 10, 1969, in Columbus, Ohio and the
     morning walk of    January 9, 1976 in Madras.)


        3. Restrictions and requirements imposed


     In 19938, the Committee directed Lokanath Swami to seek


forgiveness from Satya and to spend at least two months in Vrindavan


in a mood of repentance, praying to Srila Prabhupada and Lord Krishna


for forgiveness. He was also suspended from giving initiations until


Gaura Purnima 1996. In 1997, the GBC (having been apprised by then


of the basics of the allegations and actions taken in response via Bir


Krishna Goswami’s email) further decided that all prospective disciples


should be informed of the incidents orally following a specific script.


(Appendix J)


     B. GBC review


     In July 2010, apparently triggered by Lokanath Swami’s leading


a kirtan during the New York City Ratha-yatra parade, Satya, now


aged 32, posted online, correcting what she saw as inaccuracies and


minimizations in the Information Release of 1999. (Appendix B)

In relation to her 1993 testimony, she made the following


additions/changes:




      Issue               1993 interview                                   2010 post
                             Harmonium lessons
The     nature      The touch was a rub.                          The rub went “up and
of the touch                                                      down my leg, inner leg,
                                                                  and out.”
How           she   She      “really           didn’t             She “asked him ‘What
reacted        to   think anything of it”                         are you doing?’ to which
the touch           at the time, but after                        he      replied     ‘Nothing,
                    the      Krishna             book             just concentrate on the
                    incident       she     became                 harmonium.”
                    concerned                         in
                    retrospect because “I
                    thought        that        if    he
                    could    do         something,
                    you know, as he did in
                    the living room.”
                                   Krishna book
Who       else      “The kitchen is back,                         “|.   .my mother would
was    in the       you know, where my                            walk by the room...
room                mother was. She was                           several                 times
                    the     only        one.        And           throughout        the   course
                    upstairs            was          his          of an hour.”
                    disciple, so it was just
                    me     and     him      in      the
                    room.”
What      part      She refers to the area                        She says it was “my crotch
of her body         touched     as    “my                         not on my lap.”
he touched          private area” and her
                    mom          reports’           that
                    Satya said it was her
                    “secret part.”
How       long      “So I finally, you know, said,                |“And    after that     sick feeling
the      touch      I can hold this myself. And | inside                    me   became      the   most
lasted              he just...”                                   prominent thing for me, I told
                                                                  him I was tired, and I left the
                    “So I finally got the courage                 room.”
                    to    say,     ‘I    can        hold   this

                     myself.’ And he just smiled
                     and he said, “Yes, okay, read,
                     keep reading.
                                     on




Whether he            “And     second     of   all,   you | “I am keeping the book from
seemed               know, he should have kept | touching             you   there,    so just
aware       of       his hands to himself.”                keep reading.”
the touch
                                                           “    .   any time     my   mother
                                                           would walk by the room, he
                                                           would    quickly    remove      his
                                                           hand and place it above my
                                                           head (around me). He did this
                                                           several times throughout the
                                                           course of an hour.”


                                          Shower
What       the       He “hit me on the butt” once | He “patted me on the butt”
extent      of       after pulling her out of a            once before she ran away and
the                  closet.                               again    “touched   me     on   my
touching                                                   butt” after, at which time he
was                                                        also "held my hands and put
                                                           his arms around me.”




         Hearing from Satya directly for the first time, several


members of the GBC Body called for the case to be revisited,


feeling that the version of events in Satya’s post was more severe


than that conveyed to them by the Committee and that, asa


result, the original sanctions were not sufficiently severe. Because


of this concern—as well as the publicity the post had generated


and allegations that Lokanath Swami had not complied with the

requirement to inform disciples—the entire GBC body discussed


the case over the course of two years and several GBC meetings.


      First, Lokanath Swami was permitted to keep initiating but


was asked to draft a letter to show prospective disciples explaining


the incidents.? At the 2010 Mid-Term meeting, this letter was


presented and approved. (Appendix G) At the Annual General


Meeting in Mayapur in 2011, however, some GBC members felt


more should be done and various restrictions on his ability to


continue initiating were discussed. (Appendix H) Ultimately, at


the request of the GBC, he agreed to stop initiating of his own


volition.


      Some disciples and leaders in India expressed strong


reservations about this, feeling that Lokanath Swami had been


unfairly pressured. As a result, he chose to address the GBC body


at the 2011 Mid-Term meeting and asked to be released from his


self-imposed restriction on initiating, particularly in light of the




3 It appears that, as to the factual substance of what occurred, Lokanath Swami
actively participated in an iterative process—via email and through an assistant—
sending an original draft and responding to comments and edits from various
individuals, but that some of the final word choice in terms of characterizing the
events and his feelings about them was decided upon by editors towards the end of
that process.

final version of the letter, which he believed gave the impression


that his acts were more serious than they were and some of the


wording of which was not his. His proposal was rejected.


(Appendix G)


      At the Annual General Meeting in Mayapur in 2012, the


GBC passed Resolution 502, imposing, among other things, the


following:


      1.    A two-year moratorium on initiations, which would be


           completed in October 2012;4


      2. Restriction to initiating thereafter only in the sub-


           continent of India;


      3. Requirement that all future disciples receive a letter


           written by him explaining the 1990 incidents;


      4, Restriction to travelling outside of the Indian


           Subcontinent only upon invitation of the RGB, or National


           Council in that area.


      5. Minimum 5-year restriction on travelling to North



4 Though imposed only in February 2012, the ban ended in October of that same
year. It appears this is because Lokanath Swami had—through a combination of
informal pressure, formal vote, and voluntary submission—essentially been
restrained from initiating beginning October 2010.

        America.


(Appendix K)


     In 2017, all mandatory requirements and restrictions from


the International GBC were lifted. (Appendix L) The North


American Council, however, required that, for 5 years, Lokanath


Swami could visit there only when invited by the local temple


president and GBC and if he avoided the New Jersey and


Philadelphia area and minimized his public programs in the New


York City area. (Appendix M)


  Ill. Applicable Law

     If Satya made her complaint today for the first time, the matter


would be      referred to    the   International   Child Protection   Office   of


ISKCON (“CPO”), the entity authorized by the GBC to conduct internal


disciplinary processes in response to allegations of “intrusive conduct


and abusive behaviour” towards children. But this is not the case; her


allegations    have   been   investigated   and    adjudicated   on   two   prior


occasions.


     Similarly, if those earlier decisions had been made by the CPO


itself, the current Guidelines (last revised in 2018) provide explicit

procedures for further review of prior adjudications. (Appendix N)


Firstly, a case can be appealed to        a CPO Appeal Review Panel on an


allegation that either:


       1) Procedures used in the original review prevented a fair and
          impartial hearing; or


      2) there is new and compelling additional evidence.


Likewise, a new trial is allowed if new individuals come forward with


allegations against the same respondent or if the respondent submits


overwhelming evidence showing innocence. But since the 1993 and 2012


decisions were not made by the CPO, these procedures do not apply.


      Nevertheless, the GBC did have in place at one time a mechanism


for addressing the exact situation presented here, namely determining


when to send to the CPO a case of child abuse that had been previously


adjudicated by another ISKCON entity. This procedure was set up


when the CPO was first established.


      The GBC first approved what would later be called the Task Force


in a 1996 Annual General Meeting resolution.’ The Task Force, in turn,




5 “312. That a Committee be appointed to study the current child protection
guidelines and present a revised comprehensive version (with regional variations)
by next year’s meeting. The Chairman will be Bir Krsna Maharaja. Members will
include Yasoda devi dasi, Murlivadaka dasa, Bhurijan dasa,   Jayapataka Swami,
Amarendra dasa, Sesa dasa, and all current members of the board of Education.”

developed the plan and policies to establish the CPO late in 1997 (this


document was known as the ISKCON Child Protection Task Force


Report), and this proposal was approved by the GBC at the 1998


Annual General Meeting. (Appendix O) To aid in the transition period


until the CPO was fully operational, the Task Force was continued until


the end of April 1999. One of its roles, as described in that original


report, was to decide how cases pre-dating the CPO should be handled:



      b. Case of child abuse which have been dealt with in the past
      by the GBC or one of its agents (ministry of justice, ministry
      of education etc.) are subject to review by these judges
      including cases were guilt has been admitted and a sentence
      decided.

      c. The members of the GBC appointed child protection task
      force (Badrinarayan dasa, Sesa dasa, Laxmimoni dasi,
      Yasoda dasi, Anuttama dasa, Dharmaraj dasa, Manu dasa,
      Pancaratna dasa, and Dhira Govinda dasa) along with the
      chairman of the child protection central office, by a majority
      vote, will determine which of these old cases, previously
      decided, are to be opened for review.


  «   Note: Some cases may have already had thorough
      documentation or an admission of guilt or no new complaint
      from a victim, and a sentence determined and being carried
      out. All that needs to be done in a case like this is [sic] be sure
      there is a complete record with the central office. Other cases
      may have been partially researched, no clear records, a
      sentence that is not being followed or clearly inappropriate
      etc. Such cases need to be reopened and resolved via the above

     justice system, in order to have a final official record and to
     put these cases to rest once and for all.



There was to be a six-month window for reviving cases, but cases raised


later could be considered with the approval of the Task Force.


     It is not clear to what extent the named Task Force members ever


performed this function in actuality, as Dhira Govinda Dasa was


selected as the first CPO Chair (a position title later changed Director)


just a few months later and it appears he took on this function, albeit in


a de facto manner. In any event, the 1998 Task Force Report provided a


process for actually re-adjudicating such cases and a number of cases


were indeed reopened, including several that had been criminally


prosecuted. (Appendix P)


     Under this scheme, the Task Force should have evaluated


whether or not to refer this case for re-adjudication in 1998. It did not.


Instead, Dhira Govinda was informed by Ravindra Svarupa that it


should not be re-opened for two reasons: (1) it had been “grand-fathered


in,” in that it had already been dealt with by the Committee, which had


procured a professional assessment and made a decision, so they should


not “start all over again,” even if the new system has “superior

features”; and (2) there were reasons to keep it confidential, in that the


alleged abuse occurred in a private home not in a temple or gurukula


and Mr. I was understood to be a violent individual and a public

investigation might provoke him to rash acts (indeed, the family had


explained that they had never informed him of the incidents for this


reason). (Appendix Q) Dhira Govinda responded that these reasons


were “very reasonable” and that “there’s no good reason to reverse or


reconsider the decision of the committee.” (Appendix R)


      Notwithstanding this exchange, the Panel suggests that it is


appropriate for it, under the current mandate, to act as an advisory ad


hoc Task Force and to recommend whether the GBC body should


exercise its review authority over its own prior decisions to re-open this


matter and send it to the CPO.® First, Dhira Govinda did not have the


unilateral authority to make this decision as that power was vested in


the Task Force, of which the CPO Chair had but one vote among many.


And we do not know what the vote of the other members would have


been. Second, the reasons provided do not address the actual factors


that the Task Force should have considered (see bullet points below



6 The Panel suggests that this would have been the appropriate way to handle the
case in 2010 as well.

taken from italicized language above). Indeed, they seem unconvincing,


as all past cases could be considered “grandfathered in,” and one


imagines the case could have been re-opened in a way that kept it


confidential from Satya’s father.


     To that end, and drawing from the criteria used in the Task Force


guidelines on prior external adjudications, as well as (for sake of


completeness) the current CPO Guidelines on appeals, the Panel


suggests the following questions are germane:


        e   Is there adequate documentation of an earlier process?


        e   Was the process fair?


        e   Was a sentence determined?


        e   Was the sentence “clearly inappropriate”?


        e   Was the sentence followed?


        e   Are there new parties alleging abuse?


        e   Is there new evidence from any of the original parties?


     These will be used to review both the 1993 and 2012


adjudications.

The preceding sections represent the unanimous


views of the Panel. What follows, in contrast, is


broken into majority and minority views.




  IV. Discussion - Majority


        The Panel did not reach complete consensus in two critical


  sections. An asterisk (*) indicates there was disagreement as to that


  particular subsection, in which case the minority view is presented in


  brief in italics within this majority opinion itself and more fully in


  separate minority opinion sections that follow.



   1. Is there adequate documentation of an earlier process?


     This is a threshold inquiry: If there is not a record of what


happened earlier, it is impossible to evaluate it and so the case must be


re-adjudicated. If there is, then the other steps of the review can occur.


     1998


     Between Yashoda Devi’s interview notes and the 1999 Information


Release, there is a record of what was done in terms of investigating

and adjudicating Satya’s allegations, who did it, and what the outcome


was.



       Yes. There is adequate documentation of an earlier process, so this


consideration favors CLOSING the case.


       2012


       The notes of the various Mid-Term and Annual General Meetings


of the GBC provide a record of the deliberations on this matter,


including what was considered, who participated, and the interim and


final decisions.


       Yes. There is adequate documentation of an earlier process, so this


consideration favors CLOSING the case.


   2. Was the process fair?*


       Apart from the correctness of any decisions made, this


consideration focuses on how that decision was arrived at. (Flipping a


coin, to use an extreme example, might end up giving you the right


answer, but it’s hardly a reasonable way to make important decisions.)


The difficulty here is that what is a fair process when the GBC makes


an administrative decision (power-based decision) and when a CPO


panel adjudicates a case (rights-based decision) are different. For

example, under the current CPO Guidelines, cases are heard and


decided by Review Panels, whose three members are “chosen froma list


of devotees that have undergone training in the recognition and


response to the abuse of minors in understanding child abuse,


evaluating evidence, and the psychology of abusers and victims.” And


these members must “promptly disclose .. . any circumstances that


might cause doubt regarding [their] independence or impartiality”
                                                                —


such as “bias, interest in the result of the adjudication, and past or


present relations with a party or its counsel’—and this can be basis for


either party challenging that individual’s participation. When the GBC


as a body decides a disciplinary case, in contrast, it does not appear that


there are provisions in place to exclude a particular member from


voting based on lack of qualification or familiarity with the subject


matter at hand or personal relationship with the individual being


disciplined. Likewise, a CPO panel follows a rigorous evidentiary


process, considering written testimony from the alleged victim and


accused as well as “interviews with the victim and accused, statements


of witnesses, character witnesses, reports from civil and legal


authorities, and psychological assessments,” before issuing an official

decision as to whether the accused is culpable.          A GBC vote can be made


on any basis the GBC deems acceptable.


       In any event, the essence of due process is an opportunity for both


parties to present their side of the story and for a third party to hear


them, make a decision based on the evidence rather than any prejudice


or agenda, and then explain that decision.’


       1998


      A Committee of seven GBC-appointed members heard from both


sides, procured an analysis and risk assessment from three experienced


and qualified professionals at CAP, and then made a decision. Viewed


from the perspective of a GBC disciplinary action, this process was


substandard in that the Committee made the final decision rather than




7 Though not relevant to whether or not ISKCON’s internal process was fair, it does
appear that the incidents in question should have been reported to local law
enforcement and/or other governmental authorities. See New Jersey Statute § 9:6-
8.10 (2009) (reflecting requirement in place since at least 1990 that "[a]ny person
having reasonable cause to believe that a child has been subjected to child abuse or
acts of child abuse” to “report the same immediately to the Division of Youth and
Family Services by telephone or otherwise"); GBC Resolution 74 of 1989 (stating
“incidents of child molestation within ISKCON or ISKCON related organizations
must be reported by the ISKCON authority to the local governmental agency or
agencies for civil or criminal action, as appropriate"); GBC Resolution 119 of 1990
(stating “[s]uspected or confirmed cases of child abuse must be reported to local
government authorities for investigation and/or prosecution”). But see GBC
resolution 86 of 1992 (stating that only “[c]ertified cases of an obvious nature should
be turned over to the local governmental authorities and follow the normal criminal
system of justice”).

making a recommendation to the entire GBC. And to the extent that


the GBC did ratify this decision in 1997, it appears this was done based


on the summary in Bir Krishna Goswami’s email rather than a full


review of all the evidence. Viewed from the perspective of a CPO panel,


this process was substandard in that the members of the Committee


were not vetted for bias.     This is the unanimous view of the panel.


      Notwithstanding these observations, a majority of the Panel


believe that the Committee should be viewed as a hybrid under more


general principles of due process rather than strictly under the two


distinct approaches discussed above. Seen in that light, the majority is


of the view that its process seems adequate in that a multi-membered


group (less than the entire GBC but more than three) made a well-


informed decision based, in part, on expert input. The majority


therefore concludes that the earlier process was fair and that this


consideration favors CLOSING the case.


      The dissenting view is that this is based on fallacious reasoning as


the committee was firstly not vested with the authority to make a


decision and secondly, the GBC having not been placed with the full

8 For what it is worth, Dhira Govinda, in his capacity as CPO Chair, appears to
have approved of this process. (Appendix S)

facts by the committee, was placed in an insidious position that resulted


in the ratification of the reeommendations, further compounding an


unfair process. Accordingly the process was not fair.


      The dissenting view wishes to emphasize that the committee could


NOT have been the final trier of fact   - GBC adjudications on misconduct


cases are almost always decided by the full GBC, after input and


recommendations from a committee. In this case, the full GBC, which


endorsed the Committee report, was NEVER given the full information,


NOT provided with the girl’s testimony, nor presented any contrary


opinions which were strongly held by some Investigative Committee


members (e.g. Badrinarayan Swami and Yasoda devi.).

     In amplification of another point raised above regarding the GBC


process not having excluded any potential bias, it must be noted that


neither the Committee nor the GBC could be considered objective

adjudicators. Lokanath Swami, as GBC Minister, sannyasi, and guru,


attends every GBC meeting, and is good friends with many members. At


minimum, there is the appearance of conflict of interest with many of


the Investigators and GBC. For both of the above reasons, the dissent


finds that the process was not fair as envisaged by the critera which


finds its genesis in the re-opening of cases clause in the Task Force

Report / CPO Guidelines. Moreover, the very same document repeatedly


emphasizes impartiality and independence of judges as a qualification


and grounds for challenging of a judge.    This has been totally ignored in


the process adopted by the GBC and therefore can be categorically


termed an unfair process.


2012


       The subsequent review was deliberately undertaken following


normal GBC decision-making protocols, so it makes sense to evaluate it


under those standards alone, under which it does not evince any


deviations or deficiencies. In any event, even under a more exacting


judicial standard, Satya’s 2010 post can properly be considered her


testimony and the notes of the GBC proceedings show that there were


discussions with Lokanath Swami as well as participation,


presentations, and input from various GBC members—some in favor of


further restrictions and others not— with the final outcome the result of


a vote. Accordingly, it cannot be said the process was lop-sided,


arbitrary, or decided by a single individual.


       Yes. The earlier process was fair, so this consideration favors


CLOSING the case.*

     Here again, the minority differs with the majority as the GBC, for


reasons stated in the assessment of the   1993 process described above,


lacked impartiality.   This view is further supported by the fact that other


cases involving devotees of equal stature of Lokanath Swami i.e.


sannyasis, gurus and holding positions of leadership eg. GBC members


were referred to the CPO despite the fact that these cases were previously


dealt with by the GBC eg. Dhanudhara Swami.


Hence, the process remained inconsistent and accordingly unfair.


   3. Was a sentence determined?


     In the current CPO paradigm, the Official Decision of a Review


Panel must “clearly state any Restrictions, Requirements, and


Recommendations it deems appropriate.”


     1998


     The CAP team made suggestions, including that Lokanath


Swami “not allow himself to be alone with a woman or child, that he not


spend more than one day/night with any one family while travelling,


and that he seek the ongoing support of his colleagues via


communications with him during his travels.” Subject to these


restrictions, they said he “should remain in his role as a religious leader

... [g]iven the unique conditions that prompted the episodes, and given


the fact that there is no reason to expect such episodes to occur again.”


     The actual sentence, however, was issued by the seven-member


Committee in 19938, ratified by the GBC in 1997, and formally


presented in the 1999 Information Release. That document outlines


various requirements and restrictions, including a roughly two-and-a-


half-year ban on initiating (until early 1996) and a mandate that, once


he resumed, he disclose the incident to prospective disciples so they


could make a fully-informed decision.


     Yes. A sentence was determined, so this consideration favors


CLOSING the case.


   2012


     By resolution, the GBC imposed further restrictions, including the


following:


          e   A two-year ban on all initiations;


          e   A requirement that once he resumed, he do so only in India


              and only after showing a GBC approved letter to prospective


              disciples;


          e   A minimum five-year ban on travelling to North America;

        e   A requirement that he receive an invitation from national or


            regional GBC bodies before traveling to other parts of the


            world.



     Yes. A sentence was determined, so this consideration favors


CLOSING the case.


4.   Was the sentence “clearly inappropriate”?*


     A. Standard of review


     The phrase used is instructive. The 1998 Task Force was not


asked to decide if the sentence that was imposed in a prior adjudication


of a case was appropriate, i.e. what they would have imposed if they had


been adjudicating it. Rather they were asked to determine if that


sentence was clearly inappropriate. In other words, even if they would

have done things differently, is what was done so obviously out of the


bounds of propriety that the case should be re-adjudicated.


     As it happens, this approach exactly mirrors that taken in the


federal criminal justice system. Under the United States Supreme


Court’s Booker case, when either side is appealing a sentence, the


reviewing court simply decides if what the trial court did was


reasonable. And reasonableness is a range, not a point. That is to say,

the reviewing court may not reverse the trial court simply because it


would have imposed a different sentence; on the contrary, it must


affirm the trial court's judgment so long as the sentence falls within the


realm of rationally available choices. Under this standard, the


challenging party can undo the sentence only if they show no


reasonable person would adopt the trial court’s view.


     Though other sanctions were imposed, we'll focus here on the


primary one at issue, namely temporary restrictions on serving as an


initiating guru.


     B. Nature of conduct


     1993


     The CAP team found that Lokanath Swami had acted in a


“transgressive” and “clearly inappropriate manner.” Specifically, when


“some sexual feelings unexpectedly arose” within him “he yielded,


momentarily, to impulse.”


     But these acts were “not consciously planned” and instead were


“brought about by a highly unusual concatenation of cireumstances"—


namely his broken leg, his confinement “for a prolonged period to an


unfamiliar domestic atmosphere,” and “the strong desire of the father

for Lokanath Swami to administer discipline and instruction to the girl”


which “drove him into closer association with a female than he would


ordinarily venture’—all of which “evoked feelings of early family ties


coupled with feelings of vulnerability due to his physical limitations and


took him briefly out of his usual sense of himself.


      At bottom, they opined that he was “not a pedophile” and “[did]


not pose a danger of overt sexual violence toward women and children.”


Rather, “with a minimum of precautions,” such transgressions “should


be easy to avoid in the future.”


     Based on this analysis and input, the Committee concluded:


     Lokanath Swami’s fault quite exactly exemplified what Srila
     Prabhupada termed an ‘accidental’ mistake (B.G. 9.30-31).
     Lokanath Swami’s transgression was not planned or
     premeditated. It was, to use Prabhupada’s terminology,
     unconscious, not wilful [sic], unknowing. (See for example,
     the conversation of May 10, 1969, in Columbus, Ohio and the
     morning walk of    January 9, 1976 in Madras.)


     Because the CAP team never used the terms “sexual abuse” or


“molestation” and because the Committee used the term “accidental,”


the Panel feels it is important to clarify what these two bodies believe


occurred. Broadly speaking, there are three possibilities:

       1)     PREMEDITATED: Lokanath Swami intentionally planned


to be at Satya’s home and/or arranged occasions where the two of them


would be in close proximity so that he could gratify himself sexually by


touching her.


       2)     ACCIDENTAL: At no point preceding any of his touches did


Lokanath Swami have any sexual motivations. The harmonium and


shower touches were intentional but done in a fatherly mood, and the


Krishna book touch was done unconsciously and innocently, with him


removing his hand as soon as he realized what he had done.


       3)     SITUATIONAL/OPPORTUNISTIC:             Lokanath     Swami     was


circumstantially put into an unprecedented situation, staying at Satya’s


house full-time while he was injured and under instructions to interact


with   her.   Over   the   course   of these   interactions,   sexual   feelings


unexpectedly arose and, unprepared for how to manage them, he gave


in and touched Satya to gratify them.


       Both scenarios one and three constitute abuse, though scenario


one would merit a more severe reaction given the abuser’s mentality,


while scenario three, though likely having the same effect on the victim,


could justify a more lenient sentence. Scenario two, in contrast, does not

constitute abuse. The Panel believes that the third scenario is the only


logical interpretation of what both the CAP team and the Committee


found, and this is also consistent with several versions of Lokanath


Swami’s testimony. (Appendices C, E)


     The CAP team explicitly ruled out scenario one. And their word


choice rules out scenario two. (In other words, if he had claimed total


innocence before them and they had believed him, we cannot see how


they would write the report they did.) Rather, their extensive discussion


of Lokanath Swami’s background, the unusualness of the situation he


found himself in, and the unlikelihood of his acts recurring indicate that


they concluded scenario three was applicable. In other words, he did do


something wrong in his touching of Satya, but it was situational to an


extreme degree and would thus be easy to avoid in the future.


     The Committee also ruled out scenario one. Beyond that, the


Committee’s understanding can best be explored by examining the


quotes from Srila Prabhupada they cite. (Appendix T) True enough, in


the Gita purports, he uses the term “accidental.” But the context shows


that he does not mean it in the literal sense. For one thing, he uses


synonyms for accidental falldown that convey something other than

happenstance, such as “temporary falldown” and “occasional falldown.”


More importantly, he explains the reason behind such a falldown in


terms that show it is not an innocent mistake but rather a genuine—if


unexpected and short-lived—giving in to temptation. For example,


“(t]he material contamination is so strong that even a yogi fully engaged


in the service of the Lord sometimes becomes ensnared.” Or this


passage:



     this verse only refers to an accident due to the strong power
     of material connections. Devotional service is more or less a
     declaration of war against the illusory energy. As long as one
     is not strong enough to fight the illusory energy, there may
     be accidental falldowns.


           This interpretation of accident implying something volitional


but unplanned is consistent with the other sources cited. (Appendix U)


On his morning walk in 1976 in Madras, Srila Prabhupada explains:


     [alecident .. . He had former habit, and unknowingly he has
     done something wrong. That is accident. That is explained
     by Bhaktivinoda Thakura. Not purposefully doing wrong.
     That is aparadha. Namnad balad yasya hi papa-buddhih.


A true accident (scenario two) has nothing to do with one’s past habits;


a momentary lapse (scenario three) does. This is contrasted with what


he calls purposefully (scenario one), which he equates with committing


sinful activities on the strength of chanting.

     The same contrast is presented in the            1969 conversation in


Columbus, depicting an accidental falldown on one hand:


     He is not doing any wrong consciously, but due to habit...
     Suppose just like most of you were, in your former life, you
     were smoking or taking intoxication. But by some influence,
     if you sometimes take to it, .. . that is excused if you have
     done unconscious.


With a premeditated one on the other:


     But if you think that "Now I am Krsna conscious. Whatever I
     do, it is right," then it is great sin.


     In   the   end,   the   strongest   evidence   that   both   the   original


Committee and the CAP team found the conduct fell under scenario


three is that they both suggested some restrictions and requirements


(incompatible with scenario two) but these were relatively limited


(incompatible with scenario one).


     2012


     Though the GBC did not make any explicit findings, it is clear


from their actions that they agreed with the finding of culpability in the


earlier Committee decision and re-opened the case because they found


that the allegations, though still concerning the same basic acts at issue


earlier, were more severe than originally understood.

     C. CPO Guidelines


     Under current CPO Guidelines, Lokanath Swami’s conduct (as


determined by the Committee in 1993 and ultimately the GBC in 2012)


would constitute sexual abuse, specifically a kind of fondling, because


he “use[d] a child to meet [his] own sexual needs.” (Appendix N)


     The 2006 Guidelines (but not later versions) offer a way to classify


offenses, including under Category 1:


     Precursors to sexual abuse, 1.e., the "private parts" were not
     touched but the child's body space was violated with the
     clear intent of being sexual if the progression had not ceased.
     (For example, the legs were caressed. It is a misdemeanor as
     long as there was no threat, coercion, intimidation, or
     psychological trauma to the child.


     and under Category 2:


     Sexual abuse, including kissing, fondling, voyeurism,
     exhibitionism, oral sex, sodomy, pornography, forced
     masturbation, and intercourse.


     Under this categorization, Lokanath Swami’s transgression would


fall at the least severe end of the spectrum of sexual abuse under


Category 2. (Appendix V)


     The only special classification under the current Guidelines is


what is deemed “serious sexual abuse,” namely unusual cases that


warrant a “zero tolerance” sentence, i.e. a lifetime ban on any

participation with ISKCON. Such extreme cases include “evidence of


some of the following elements”:


     The sexual abuse includes instances where violence, force, or
     the threat of violence is used; the sexual act itself is of a very
     invasive nature, the acts are repeated, and where there is
     great physical or psychological distress experienced by the
     victim.


Lokanath Swami’s conduct could potentially but probably does not


qualify. Clearly there was no violence involved and it was not of a very


invasive nature. At the same time, the allegations involve multiple


touches over the course of a week. As for psychological distress on the


part of Satya, it is expected that any victim of abuse will suffer some


such distress but it is unclear whether Satya’s was more than the


average victim such that it should qualify as “great.”


     At bottom, given the range of sexual abuse described in the


Guidelines as well as the historical context of actual CPO cases, it is


hard to dispute that the allegations here fall somewhere at the less


severe end of the spectrum. And “[i]n instances of less severe case of


abuse, the Panel may modify select restrictions as appropriate,”


including “time limitations on restrictions” and “limiting restrictions to


certain temples or areas.”

      D. Other CPO cases


      The CPO routinely imposes lifetime leadership bans on


devotees found culpable of child sexual abuse, even where the


allegations involve relatively mild conduct, such as kissing on the


mouth or caressing of the legs. Indeed, the Panel was not able to find


any case in which the CPO imposed anything less on a devotee found


culpable of any kind of child sexual abuse.


      E. Secular law


      Under New Jersey law at the time, one or more of Lokanath


Swami’s acts would constitute sexual assault because they involved


touching Satya’s genital area, inner thigh, or groin; were done


intentionally; and were for the purpose of sexual gratification.? The


presumptive sentence for such a crime is (and was) 7 years, which can


be increased or decreased based ona list of mitigating or aggravating


factors.



9 The Panel secured a legal opinion as to the exposure of any ISKCON entities
based on Lokanath Swami’ acts, and they found the risk of civil or criminal
lability to be very low. (Appendix X)

      F. Professional opinion


     The CAP team, a group of professionals, was aware of the 1993


allegations and found that the incidents both occurred and constituted


volitional transgressions, but they nevertheless recommended that


Lokanath Swami continue to serve as a guru because it was not the


result of predatory tendencies or even everyday temptation but the


practically unforeseeable product of a one-time “perfect storm” of


circumstances.


      G. Conclusion


     A majority of the Panel concludes that Lokanath Swami was


found in the prior adjudications to have committed one or more acts of


child sexual abuse (as defined by the CPO) but that these acts were


relatively less severe and resulted from an extreme one-time set of


circumstances. Although it is likely that the CPO, had it made the


decision, would have permanently banned Lokanath Swami from


initiating in the future, in light of all the above considerations, the


Panel finds that doing so only temporarily and on a geographic basis


was within the spectrum of reasonable sentences and so, under the

applicable legal standard, that decision should not be reversed or


altered.1°


       No. The sentence was not “clearly inappropriate”, so this


consideration favors CLOSING the case.*


       Whilst the Minority does not agree with the restrictive


interpretation of the “clearly inappropriate” sentence as applied herein


(and our views thereon are expressed in great detail in the Dissent


presented at the end of the this report), we concur with the Majority


opinion in its determination that the evidence points toward some type of


child sexual abuse committed by Lokanath Swami. In fact, applying the


standard definitions as found in the CPO Policies and Procedures,


Lokanath Swamti’s conduct clearly does qualify as sexual abuse, as he


exerted a position of power (age, sannyasa, guru status) on a fairly


innocent 11 year old girl. His actions include “fondling” which is


specifically mentioned in this section.


10 One of the purposes of a restriction on initiating or taking other leadership roles
is to prevent and deter the individual found culpable from committing anything
similar in the future. When a sentence is imposed shortly after the conduct, it is
impossible to know if this will happen, and so caution urges being over- rather than
under-restrictive. Where, as here, we have the benefit of over 30 years of hindsight,
the case for restricting on this basis is weak. In other words, we would be remiss to
ignore the fact that no further allegations or complaints have been made against
Lokanath Swami, despite various periods when he was able to travel and even
initiate.

        As mentioned, this is also considered a Second Degree Felony in


New Jersey, which carries a standard prison sentence of seven years.


Lokanath Swami’s conduct clearly would qualify by all ISKCON


and criminal legal standards as an act of child sexual abuse.


   Our concerns, however, are the Majority’s:


   1. Characterizing of the actual activity as “the allegations here fall


somewhere at the less severe end of the spectrum” which mitigates


against a severe sentence, thereby concluding that temporary or


regionally localized restrictions are appropriate.


      This conclusion not only minimizes the impact of abuse, but is


inconsistent with other cases adjudicated by the CPO, where rather

strong lifetime restrictions were placed where there was “less severe”


instances of abuse.


      This point is discussed at length with several examples in the main


Dissent at the end of this Majority report.


   2. Overall, we find little consideration for the psychological impact


on the victim. The Majority report states we cannot determine this


impact, but yet the victim herself at the age of 14 years old in 1998


reports how the incidents made her feel:

Victim: “So I finally got the courage to say, “I can hold this myself.” And
he just smiled and he said, “Yes, okay, read, keep reading.” And I was so
scared, and you know, finally, about a half and hour later, I guess, I
didn’t know how it ended. I guess he let me go, or I dont know, but I felt
very disgusted and terrible. I can’t describe the feeling, it’s just
like I felt very dirty... “

These would be exactly the feelings described by the CAP report:

     e   the girl had legitimate feelings of violation and abuse

     e   She may experience traumatic sequelae common to victims of
         sexual abuse

         One must also bear in mind that it is undisputed there were three


different incidents of varying degrees of touches complained of and


which occurred over a span of a week. Hence, we differ with the


majority’s conclusion that the sentence was not “clearly inappropriate.”


5.       Was the sentence followed?


         Lokanath Swami complied with all restrictions and requirements


imposed in 1993, save the duty to inform aspiring disciples. He


admitted that he stopped doing this around 2000 at the urging of


disciples but did not consult with the GBC in making this decision.


(Appendix G)




                                    ~AA~

      It appears that Lokanath Swami has complied with all restrictions


and requirements imposed in 2012.1!


      Yes. Given his lapse in following all terms of the 1993 sentence,


this consideration possibly favored re-opening the case when the GBC


reviewed in 2010. But his substantial compliance since then favors


CLOSING the case now.


6.    Are there new parties alleging abuse?


      No. This consideration favors CLOSING the case.


7.    Is there substantial new evidence from any of the original
      parties?


      A.     Satya


             2012


      In 2010, Satya spoke on her own behalf and presented a new


version of her story. (She did this in response to the version presented


in the 1999 Information Release.) As a threshold matter, this was not


technically additional evidence but rather a change in testimony.


Moreover, her original interview was taken when she was 14 years old


11 The Panel’s understanding is that he did visit Alachua in 2019 to perform
initiations on the invitation of a disciple without securing permission from the
temple president. However, it appears the disciple had a management role
(Congressional Development Director), Lokanath Swami had assumed his disciple
had secured permission, and that the temple president did not cancel the visit even
though she did learn of it beforehand.

and the contents indicate she was willing and able to provide her views


in full. In any event, assuming this post did indeed constitute new


evidence, was it substantial?


     To answer that question, we must compare it not to that 1999


document (which was an after-the-fact representation of the incidents


made to ISKCON at large), but rather to her original 1993 interview, as


that was the information used by the CAP team and the Committee in


actually adjudicating the case. Looking at the chart earlier in this


report, we note that she does not mention new or different incidents,


and that many core details of the existing incidents remained


consistent, including the nature of the touch during harmonium lessons


(a rub), the area touched during the Krishna book reading (private


area/crotch), the duration of this touch (long enough for her to work up


the courage to say something), and the nature of the pre-shower touch


(a pat on the butt).


     The biggest difference was the portrayal of Lokanath Swami’s


consciousness of the touches. In the 1993 version, neither of them


seemed aware of or disturbed by the harmonium touches, but in the


2010 version she points out her discomfort and he continues regardless.

He similarly expresses awareness of what body part he is touching


during the Krishna book reading but continues, even replacing his hand


there several times after interruptions by her mother.!2


      Given all of the above, this consideration possibly favored re-


opening the case when the GBC reviewed it between 2010 and 2012.18


In any event, the question is moot because that is exactly what they did,


addressing the matter themselves, holding discussions (some with and


some without Lokanath Swami), deciding additional restrictions were


warranted, and imposing them.


      Now


      As for the present, Satya herself has not provided any additional


information this time around and, indeed, is not involved at all. And


those advocating on her behalf and urging that the case be re-opened


point to procedural issues with the prior adjudication and/or concerns




12 Another difference is that she elaborated on the extent of the harmonium and
shower touches, and, at least with the former, the elaboration may have been
significant because the inner thigh is an area that would make the act sexual abuse
under NJ law. But overall those changes do not seem substantial for purposes of re-
opening the case.


18 Although such information is not reflected in the 1993 interview transcript, it
appears that Yasoda Devi was aware of the more extensive conduct Satya described
in 2010 and conveyed that information to the Committee and CAP team, in which
case re-opening the case would not have been warranted. (Appendix Y)

about the restrictions imposed and do not present any additional


substantive information.


        Conclusion


        No. Because those seeking referral of this case to the CPO have


not supplied compelling new evidence, this consideration favors


CLOSING the case.'4


   V.     Conclusion and Recommendation - Majority

        In conclusion, a majority of the members of the Panel feel the


Committee’s       original   response to    Satya’s    allegations in    1993      was


reasonable, but that the Task Force as a whole should have decided


that question in 1998 in considering whether to re-open the case rather


than just a couple members. It was another error when the GBC in


2010,    having    presumably     decided    that     there   was   sufficient     new


evidence to re-examine the case, did not leave that process to the CPO.


14 Various individuals have submitted information to the Panel for consideration.
Most prominently, representatives of Lokanath Swami have submitted several
lengthy documents. All of this information has been read and reviewed and has, to
the extent relevant, informed our analysis. That being said, factual allegations
about the underlying events contained in these documents have not been
incorporated. Lokanath Swami did not instigate the current review. Accordingly, we
view that information as something he would want considered if his case was
reopened but not part of an independent request that the case be reopened. And so
we do not here offer an analysis of whether the documents convey new and
compelling evidence that would warrant such re-opening.

For all that, a majority of the Panel deems what the GBC did do in


terms of process and decision as sufficient and, further, does not find


that any new evidence or other exceptional circumstances warrant re-


opening the case. In other words, the interests of justice do not here


require overriding the bedrock legal principles of finality and closure


and it would be wrong for the GBC to take any further action on this


matter, such as issuing further restrictions or referring to the CPO.


       The majority offers a few final thoughts in light of the minority


opinion, which we find well-considered and well-meaning but ultimately


unconvincing:


   @   We do not agree with the minority’s conjecturing potential


criteria for re-evaluating the GBC’s 1993 and 2012 decisions in this case


on the grounds that they were administrative rather than judicial


decisions because the original Task Force Report provided_explicit


criteria for deciding which previous child abuse decisions should be re-


opened, in full awareness that these were administrative decisions,


namely “Case[s] of child abuse which have been dealt with in the past


by the   GBC    or one of its agents   (ministry of justice,   ministry of


education etc.).”

    e   The “clearly inappropriate” standard that the Task Force Report


thus provided for reviewing the prior sentences is not a technicality or


loophole, but rather a fundamental principle of law. One can only


imagine the chaos if every punishment issued by decision-makers in our


world—be they criminal judge or ecclesiastical body—were subject to


increase or decrease merely because another decision-maker, years


later, believed a different punishment was more appropriate;


    @   We cannot sanction re-writing the 2007 GBC resolution


concerning leadership restrictions on cases decided by the CPO to cover


any child abuse decisions.!> If that was what the GBC intended, it


should have said so. And if that is what it wants now, it should


amend that resolution. In any event, the restrictions placed on


Lokanath Swami were temporary and have all expired, so any


restriction on him initiating would also have expired.


    @   Even accepting the dissent’s analysis, we note that it does not




15 GBC Resolution: “Whenever the ISKCON Central Office of Child Protection rules
that an offense is such as to restrict a person from serving in ISKCON in positions
of leadership (including but not limited to offices of GBC, minister, zonal secretary
or temple officer), the restriction must include the position of initiating guru. This
restriction shall apply to all previous and future decisions of the Central Office of
Child Protection.”

suggest referring this case to the CPO or placing restrictions on


Lokanath Swami beyond prohibiting future initiations.


   @®   Finally, we point out that, notwithstanding the analysis


presented here in the majority opinion, a very strong argument could be


made that the exchange between Dhira Govinda and Ravindra Svarupa


cited earlier in this report could be considered conclusive in and of itself


in terms of ending this matter once and for all. In actuality, Dhira


Govinda acted in place of the full Task Force and in his capacity as CPO


Chair in considering which past cases should be re-opened and agreed


that this one should not be. By that logic, what the Panel has done here


(i.e. acting as an ad hoc Task Force) already occurred and it was


therefore wrong to re-open the case in 2010 and continues to be wrong


to do it now. (Importantly, the entire GBC body may have not known all


the facts until 2010, but the Committee—who made the actual decision


of which Dhira Govinda approved—did have those facts.)




  VI.     Discussion — Minority (Two Panelists)

        We acknowledge and appreciate the work of our fellow panelists


which has resulted in the opinion of the Majority Report. We, of the

Dissent, also closely participated in the research, discussion, writing,


and final presentation of the majority opinion. And while we appreciate


and agree with many of the individual points and even the conclusion of


several sections, we differ with the final conclusion and


recommendation as well as with other aspects that will become evident


from our below submissions.


     Some of the principles underlying the Majority opinion rest on 1)

the procedure of due process, while flawed in the GBCs previous

handling, was adequate, particularly as the GBC has reviewed the case

three times, and 2) that the standard for any re-opening or re-

examination of the case has not been met. We understand this is a

legitimate position, but also feel that this may be overly restrictive, and

we should also look at other principles.


The following sections will advance the following positions of the

Dissent:


   1. We feel another conclusion may better support the goal of

     achieving justice.

     We feel that there are additional grounds for re-visiting cases.

     We also discuss double jeopardy exceptions in CPO cases.

     We address the principles of finality and closure

     We discuss differences between an administrative decision and

     judicial decision.

  6. We then present our recommendations and possible remedies to

     the current situation for the GBC to consider.



BASIS OF DISSENTING OPINION:



   1. Need for justice and correct conclusions


     One perspective involves the difference between a rights based

(judicial) system, and a power based (administrative) decision. This has

been discussed previously in the main body of this paper. Broadly

speaking, a GBC decision is more administrative (which it should be, as

the GBC is the highest administrative body in ISKCON), whereas the

CPO is more of a rights based judicial system. Our view is that the

rights based principle of justice has not been served, and provides one

strong reason to re-examine the case.




     We need to determine if past adjudications of the case

incorporated both due process, and a just process; it must be fair, and it

must make the right decision.




     Throughout the various sections of the Panel report, both the

Majority opinion and the “Dissenting views” have been largely in

agreement regarding the following pertinent points:


1. Some type of child sexual abuse was perpetrated by Lokanath

   Swami.

   CPO case precedents have consistently restricted abusers from

   positions of leadership for offenses no more severe than alleged of

   Lokanath Swami.

   Previous decisions have ignored that he committed a criminal felony

   of child sexual assault in the jurisdiction where it happened.



And the dissent finds these additional points to be clearly established as

well:

4, The CPO should have handled this case from 1998 onward. In fact, it

   was deliberately withheld.

   The case was decided on administrative standards (although ethical

   and spiritual standards are certainly considered by the GBC) rather

  than a rights-based approach.

   There were definite conflicts of interest in that most of the GBC

  knew Lokanath Swami well and had worked with him on the GBC.

   The sentence was very light, and inconsistent with other CPO cases

   which lead to restrictions on leadership.




This all leads to a conclusion of the Dissent that the Lokanath Case was

deliberately handled differently than every other case of abuse in

ISKCON; it gives the perception of preferential treatment, and used a

very light standard that was more administrative in nature, rather

than a judicial proceeding.


        Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the current position of no

further restrictions on Lokanath Swami should be reconsidered.

This consideration favors re-opening the case.



  2. The standard of “clearly inappropriate” may be applied in

     other ways.


     As one perspective of the Majority opinion is that the past

handling of the case was not “clearly inappropriate,” we discuss this at

some length in the following section. While this is a somewhat technical

legal argument, it is necessary to include, as the Majority opinion does

advance this as one argument.




Analysis of “clearly inappropriate”


     The standard of “clearly inappropriate” should be assessed on the

basis of being outside the bounds of propriety as suggested by the

Majority of the panelists, is respectfully disagreed with.


     In considering whether a case previously dealt with by the GBC or

one of its agents should be re-opened by the Task Force / CPO

particularly that of whether a sentence that has been imposed is

“clearly inappropriate” warrants more than a literal interpretation of

the words that form this criteria.




     Here’s the exact wording and context with texts boldfaced for

discussion hereunder:

b. Case of child abuse which have been dealt with in the past by the

GBC or one of its agents (ministry of justice, ministry of education etc.)

are subject to review by these judges including cases were guilt has

been admitted and a sentence decided.




c. The members of the GBC appointed child protection task force

(Badrinarayan dasa, Sesa dasa, Laxmimoni dasi, Yasoda dasi,

Anuttama dasa, Dharmaraj dasa, Manu dasa, Pancaratna dasa, and

Dhira Govinda dasa) along with the chairman of the child protection

central office, by a Majority vote, will determine which of these old

cases, previously decided, are to be opened for review.


Note: Some cases may have already had thorough documentation or an

admission of guilt or no new complaint from a victim, and a sentence

determined and being carried out. All that needs to be done in a case like

this is be sure there is a complete record with the central office. Other

cases may have been partially researched, no clear records, a sentence

that is not being followed or clearly inappropriate etc. Such cases need

to be reopened and resolved via the above justice system, in order to

have a final official record and to put these cases to rest once

and for all.




When drawing on how the courts interpret statutes, they are required

to apply the literal approach 1.e. ordinary meaning of the words.

However, the ordinary meaning is just the starting point and only used

to make certain that the interpreter does not accord artificial, strained

or unnatural meaning to a text. The interpreter is to be mindful that

the context, both inside and outside of the text could influence the

meaning.




To interpret a text in its context includes the intra-textual context and

the enactment as a whole (in this case to ascertain whether the case

should be re-opened) as well as the extra-textual context 1.e. the rest of

the existing law and other contextual considerations that might be

applicable (in this case the purpose of the task force and the

establishment of the CPO for the addressing of allegations of child

abuse to be dealt with properly and consistently). The Task Force

Report can be viewed as an attempt by the GBC to establish policies

and procedures for attending to child abuse complaints and to provide

guidelines on, inter alia, “sentencing.” This would assist in establishing

clear standards and consistency in the handling of complaints. The part

to be interpreted has to be construed in the context of the bigger

picture. Text and context cannot be separated. Hence, the criteria,

“clearly appropriate” is not intended to be restrictively interpreted.


     Moreover, the inclusion of “etc.” at the end of the list of

considerations definitely supports the view that the criteria is not

exhaustive and leaves room for discretion to be applied.

     Additionally, one has to consider the purpose of this criteria 1.e.

the intention of the drafters, and that has been made clearly known

(Appendix O at Pg. 105).


     In law, when interpreting statutes, the historical context of the

particular legislation is used to place the provision in question in its

proper perspective. This historical context is known as the mischief

rule. It is one of the cornerstones of the text in context approach. It

poses four questions to help establish the meaning of legislation.


     Hereunder are the four questions and answers as applied to this

provision in the CPO Guidelines:


i. What was the existing law (the legal position) before the legislation in

question was adopted?


GBC Resolutions authorized the Board of Education to deal with the

investigation of child abuse cases.


it. Which problem (mischief or defect) was not adequately addressed

before the new legislation (in this case the CPO Guidelines) was

adopted?


a) Cases were being dealt with on an ad hoc basis by the Board of

Education and it was becoming apparent that cases of child abuse did

not only occur in gurukulas.


(b) Cases were being investigated yet did not have formal decisions


iit. What remedy is proposed by the new legislation to solve this problem?


(a) Defining what constitutes abuse and the different types of abuse;

(b) CPO be established to attend to all cases;


(c) Delineate investigative and adjudicatory processes giving due

cognizance to fair and due processes; and


(d) Sentencing guidelines and Appeals (double jeopardy and exception)


iv. What is the true reason for the proposed remedy.


To create a separation of powers by establishing an office to attend to

cases and for the objective handling of all cases resulting in consistency

in investigations, adjudications, sentencing and appeals.




     Hence, in this circumstance, the criteria for re-opening a case

should also include whether the sentence is inconsistent with other

comparable cases.




     The moral dilemma if not allowed to use value judgment but

simply give effect to provisions in CPO Guidelines based on literal

interpretation, would result in the Task Force (and subsequently the

CPO in this case) being simply enforcers of the letter of the law without

taking into consideration the spirit / purpose of the office and a

miscarriage of justice prevailing. Hence, even if it argued that the

drafters intended the literal meaning of “clearly inappropriate” it would

be remiss from a value judgment application in the context of the Task

Force Report, to not review the merit of this criteria in alignment with

appropriateness of the sentence in comparison with other similar cases.

        Past CPO rulings have consistently prohibited abusers from any

position of authority.


Further, even if we characterize the Lokanath Swami case as “less

severe,” these types of cases normally lead to similar restrictions.


Some examples:


Similar cases of less severe child sexual abuse, or precursors of
abuse (names with-held in instances which would lead to the
identity of the victim becoming known):




A report dated November 5, 1996, states that D dasa caressed and
kissed his 13 year old step-daughter put his hand on his step-daughter’s
chest, though he didn’t touch her breasts, and that he kissed the girl on
the lips. CPO Decision Restriction: Lifetime leadership ban



ICOCP has received reports that H dasa sexually molested a 9 year old
girl.   H has

admitted to this allegation. CPO Decision Restriction: Lifetime
leadership ban



I das     _- found responsible for precursors of sexual abuse, including
kissing a young girl

CPO Decision Restriction: Lifetime leadership ban



M das — responsible for caressing the legs of an 11 year old girl (at his
home, daughter of friend) CPO Decision Restriction: Lifetime
leadership ban

There seems no doubt that the offenses committed in the Lokanatha

Swami case would certainly lead to a restriction on leadership positions.


The GBC resolution of 1997, which was added to CPO Policy, confirmed

that a “position of leadership” included the position of initiating guru.


This consideration favors re-opening the case.


   3. Other appeal criteria included for re-opening the case


        Whilst the CPO Guidelines’ grounds for requesting an appeal are

very limited and have been correctly applied in enquiring whether this

case should be re-opened, having adduced sufficient grounds for the

broad interpretation of the criteria and the discretion to add other

criteria by virtue of the phrase “etc.” one could also consider adding

another appeal criteria.


        In the ordinary course of appeal hearings (NB. not CPO) in respect

of sentencing, the test would be: Would an appeal body (this could be

extrapolated to be the Task force / CPO judges) hearing the same

evidence have arrived at a different sentence, and if so, then the appeal

body has the authority to impose a sentence it believes the previous

trier of fact ought to have imposed.


        With reference to this criteria and the comparable case decisions,

this consideration favors re-opening the case.




   4.   Exception to double jeopardy provision in the 2006 task

        force report/ CPO guidelines

     Once again adopting the discretion conferred by “etc.” and the text

in context approach, one can consider applying the exception to double

jeopardy as contained in Section K of the 2006 Task Force Report/CPO

Guidelines:



Exception: If new evidence arises which is so convincing and points to

offenses which are so egregious, the executive director of the central

child protection office and the three member of the GBC executive

committee, by Majority vote, can reopen a case and initiate a second

hearing.



     Therefore, if one were to apply the standards contained in the

2006 Report for assessing the re-opening of a case, then the above in

light of the fact that Satya’s complete complaints point to offences that

are so egregious would favor re-opening the case.



However, it can be argued that when applying the 2009 CPO Guidelines

which were in place when the GBC body were fully aware of the

allegations, this provision for re-opening had been removed and would

favor CLOSING the case.



  5. Re-opening the case and the principle of finality of

     judgment (decisions)

     Notwithstanding the fact that, in our opinion, there are grounds

as identified above, for the re-opening of this case, one has to also

consider the objective of re-opening as stated and re-iterated here: “in

order to have a final official record and to put these cases to rest once

and for all.”


      Finality of judgments is an embellished rule that cannot be

ignored.


     Lokanath Swami’s case had been reviewed by the GBC body in

1997 (arguably without full knowledge of the facts), in 2012 and then

again in 2017.   The intention of the re-opening provision in the 2006

Task Force report would be to bring finality to a matter. This matter

had been repeatedly reviewed and the GBC body in 2012 passed a

resolution in full knowledge of all the facts and should not as a result of

its remarkable ineptitude now be allowed to re-open the case.




      Finality should have prevailed in 2012. It would be procedurally

unfair to re-open the case (which would entail the CPO investigating

and adjudicating this matter de novo) after it having been subjected to

two reviews, post the GBC body being fully acquainted with the matter

in 2010.

      However, instigating a full CPO adjudication procedure is quite

different than an administrative decision to correct an error, as

explained below.



   6. Differences between administrative and judicial processes:

     While there seems to be sufficient argument to discourage a full

judicial finding, nonetheless, the decisions made by the GBC herein are

not judicial decisions but administrative decisions, and in accordance

with its right to do so as the ultimate managerial authority, and it can

be argued that as such, although not ideal, its decision can be further

reviewed.



      This discussion often raises the question of “double jeopardy.”

The first question is whether the prior processes that took place were

adjudicatory processes and if so, whether the processes were established

and made known to all parties.

     It appears that the processes were administrative and not

adjudicatory in nature and as such both res judicata and double

Jeopardy are not applicable herein.



     Res judicata is applicable in civil cases whilst double jeopardy is

the equivalent in criminal cases. Both enshrine the principle that a

person cannot be tried for the same matter more than once (based on

same parties and same cause of action/offence).



     However, administrative decisions can be taken on review. There

is no limitation for an administrative body re-visiting, changing, or

implementing new decisions.



     Of course, changing decisions cannot be totally arbitrary.

Principles of due process and fairness should prevail. For an

administrative disciplinary decision to be taken on review, it would

have to be shown that the decision was unlawful, unreasonable or

procedurally unfair.



      Grounds for review could include bias, lack of procedural fairness,

review of the decision-making process and applicability of the law (CPO

Guidelines in this case when the role of the CPO was usurped by the

GBC in an administrative capacity). In short, there are many valid and

acceptable reasons why an administrative decision can be changed or

amended.



     Although this was not an adjudicatory process akin to that of the

CPO or even the courts, it is interesting to note that countries with

progressive legislation permit automatic reviews in limited instances in

criminal proceedings e.g. where (i) the sentence appears to be

completely at variance with sentences in similar cases which come

before the court on review; and (ii) if the sentence is unduly light, i.e. in

the sense that an appeal court will interfere, then steps should be taken

to rectify the matter.



      These criteria when applied to this case, notwithstanding the fact

that this was not an adjudication, certainly provides guidance and

sustains grounds for the GBC as an administrative body to substitute

its previous restrictions in alignment with its resolution of 2007,

discussed below.

This consideration favors re-opening the case.


  VII. Conclusion and Recommendation - Minority

     The case is not an easy and straightforward one, and requires

balancing varying, and at times, conflicting principles and policies.

While we respect the Majority opinion that the case should simply be

ended as it currently stands, we feel that there are other more nuanced

perspectives as has been outlined above.



     The GBC critically erred in not imposing the sentence that ought

to have been imposed and that is no fault of Lokanath Maharaja. The

restrictions imposed on him are inconsistent with that generally

imposed in cases of this nature. Their handling of the case instead of

turning it over to the CPO, together with the imposition of temporary

instead of permanent restrictions prohibiting the holding positions of

leadership, which includes the position of initiating guru, smacks of

partisanship.



     Despite these perceived errors, the process of the GBC handling

should be sufficiently equivalent to the standard of a CPO adjudication,

or at least must not disregard general principles of due process. As this

is an administrative decision of the GBC, it should follow the GBC’s

own laws. One of the more important GBC laws pertaining to this case

is discussed below.




     In 2007 the GBC passed a resolution that anyone found

responsible for child abuse by the CPO, and who was restricted from

positions of leadership, would also be restricted from acting as an

initiating guru, including retroactive application to past decisions. As

this paper has clearly established a case for child abuse on the part of

Lokanath Swami, and these facts are well known to the GBC, the GBC

could correct this omission and simply invoke this provision of ISKCON

law and at minimum restrict him from serving in a position of leading

including serving as an initiating guru. This would not be a new

examination or adjudication, but simply correcting past failure to apply

ISKCON law properly.




      The GBC has not complied with its own resolution of 2007:

“Whenever the ISKCON Central Office of Child Protection rules that an

offense is such as to restrict a person from serving in ISKCON in

positions of leadership (including but not limited to offices of GBC,

minister, zonal secretary, or temple officer), the restriction must include

the position of initiating guru. This restriction shall apply to all

previous and future decisions of the Central Office of Child Protection.”



SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORRECTION OF

CURRENT SITUATION

      To remedy its wrongdoing, it is recommended that the GBC make

amends by this action:

1. The GBC should strongly encourage Lokanath Swami to stop

   initiating and to resign/retire from all positions of leadership that he

   currently holds (eg. Minister of Padayatra). It is evident that

     Lokanath Swami did co-operate with the process throughout the

     many times that his case was revisited and that he complied to the

     best of his knowledge and ability (bar the period where he provides

     an explanation for not sharing the letter with prospective disciples).

     It is hoped that he will co-operate with the GBC’s directive as

     recommended above, should the GBC accept such recommendation.



       Furthermore, the GBC should in consultation with its General

     Counsel, consider reaching out to Satya with a good faith offer to

     assist her in obtaining any professional help that she may require as

     a result of the consequences of Lokanath Maharaja’s misconduct

     towards her.



2.     Should Lokanath Swami not accede to the GBC’s request to resign

     from his positions of leadership and retire from initiating, then

     further administrative action, limited to the reviewing of the

     appropriateness of the restrictions imposed, could be explored by the

     GBC in consultation with its General Counsel.     Specifically, the

     2007 Resolution gives sufficient grounds to simply enforce this

     provision such that Lokanath Swami would no longer initiate

     new disciples. This would not impact on his previously initiated

     disciples who may wish to continue to take spiritual guidance from

     him.



Ultimately, a delicate balance must be struck between the need to

ensure certainty and finality in administrative action on the one hand,

and the need to vindicate the vulnerable, uphold the credibility and

sanctity of the GBC and its decisions which need to reflect consistent

application and compliance of its own resolutions and laws.



      To prevent injustice and remedy the current imbalance, the GBC

should be permitted to reconsider its earlier decision in this case,

bearing in mind the following extract from its 2007 resolution as well as

the statement from the Task Force Report:


“Within the spiritual society of ISKCON, the GBC must strive to

balance the spiritual needs and rights of its members with those

required by their society. In this matter, a restriction placed on a

certain member as a social requirement cannot be taken automatically

to imply a judgment on that individual’s current spiritual status. Nor

does that restriction limit that devotee’s right and ability to inspire and

enlighten other people with Krishna consciousness.


Moreover, a devotee does not have to hold titles such as GBC, temple

president, diksa-guru, etc. in order to advance—and to help others

advance—in Krishna consciousness. And at times, it is necessary to

restrict access to such official positions in order to protect the

reputation of Srila Prabhupada and the integrity of his society.


The GBC asks the members of ISKCON to give serious consideration to

these reflections, and it begs for their understanding and cooperation as

it attempts to balance the needs of individuals in ISKCON with those of

ISKCON as a society.”

From Section G of Task Force Report (2006 CPO Guidelines):


“Further, if they become involved in any type of leadership positions

(regardless of the degree of actual risk), it will become an

embarrassment to our Society, bring about further loss of faith in our

second generation and other devotees, and constitute needless legal risk

to ISKCON.”


Finally, and solely for the purposes of ease of reference, here are the

reasons that underpin the re-opening provision as provided by the

drafters of the Task Force Report and as contained in Appendix O:



     “Why open up the past?

There has been much discussion over what to do about abuses from the

past. One argument is that we should learn to forgive and forget. ‘Let

the ghosts of the past sleep and get on with the future.’ We are not

alone in finding our-selves at such a crossroads, nor are we the first

society to be exercised by such questions. We would do well to study the

experience of others.

     When issues of injustice and abuse are unresolved, they lay under

a society like a vast underground pool of toxic waste. This seeps into the

‘water table’ of the culture and poisons the wells of faith in the leaders

and in the moral character of the institution. We are seeing these same

effects in ISKCON. Victims are calling for an accounting and justice,

families are uncertain of the ISKCON's commitment to their well being

(the oft heard complaint is that while ISKCON is very good at

constructing new buildings, it is lacking in caring for the people who

live in those buildings), and the general public questions whether we

have a moral compass and the ability to face up to and correct our

errors.


      These ghosts do not go away but rather continue to re-surface and

take their toll again and again. Paradoxically, the only way to really

close the door on a dark chapter and move on is to first open it up and

air it out. This basic truth has been confirmed again and again.”



Although written almost three decades ago, this holds true today as we

find ourselves revisiting this case and the manner it was dealt with in

the past.