Examen des dispositifs de protection (safeguarding) et de protection de l’enfance dans les écoles d’ISKCON de Mayapur et de Vrindavan (rapport d’enquête sur les gurukulas de Mayapur et de Vrindavan), 8 février 2023

Review of Safeguarding
 and Child Protection
in ISKCON Mayapur and Vrindavan schools

          8th February, 2023




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1. Overview
In a letter dated 22nd November 2022 (Annex 1), Navina Krishna das wrote to the GBC body
outlining concerns about the ongoing leadership and governance failures within ISKCON schools.
GBC member Tapan Misra das, helped develop a formal proposal off the back of this letter that
was then approved by the GBC body to trigger an 8-week inquiry with a focus on schools in
Mayapur and Vrindavan (Annex 2).

To be clear, this inquiry was to aid understanding of how to improve our governance of schools –
the inquiry was not about investigating any specific incident or person.

The inquiry team, made up of volunteers, included Usha Sahni, Dr James Biddulph, Chaitanya
Mangala, Kapila Monet, Sandipan Krishna das, Veera Makwana, and Vrindavan-bihari das. Brief
bios of the team’s two education specialists are included in Annex 3.

13 interviews, each lasting 60-120 minutes, were conducted by Navina Krishna das with the
Mayapur Executive Board, Mayapur Co-Directors, Mayapur CPT, leadership teams from all four
schools, Vrindavan CPT, International CPO, India CPO and North America CPO. The interviews
were our main source of data. A meeting with the Bureau was requested but declined; however, an
email exchange did transpire with the Vice Chair of the Bureau responding to questions asked.

What follows is a summary of the inquiry’s findings, recommendations and suggested next steps.
We request that the GBC EC make this paper publicly available in the spirit of transparency.

2. Key findings
The following are some of the key themes which emerged from our interviews:

i.     The wide gap between GBC and CPO decisions, and their respective implementation, is a
       recurring and tragic theme. Had all the GBC resolutions been enforced, had historic CPO
       sanctions been implemented, it is almost certain that many children would not have been
       abused. That is the heavy price paid by our communities for leaders ‘being asleep at the wheel’.

ii.    There appear to be well-meaning devotees in positions of responsibility but who have
       not had access to adequate governance, training, support, staffing, systems or policies.
       ISKCON seems to be operating schools as a ‘side-show’. For example, ISKCON has
       world-class deity worship, yet the comparative leadership attention, care and funds
       placed into protecting children is woefully lacking.




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iii.    The current arrangements between the International CPO and India CPO are in a
        complete mess and coordination between the two entities virtually non-existent. There
        is no clear delegation or lines of authority. On paper the GBC resolutions appear to be
        clear, but in practice they have not been implemented. The Indian Bureau has resolved
        for the Indian CPO to report to the Bureau and not to the International CPO, contrary
        to the GBC resolution. This gap between the GBC and the Bureau has caused intense
        confusion, scapegoating and impotency.

iv.     It has been made clear to the inquiry that the Bureau is the ultimate authority for
        ISKCON in India and is not obliged to cooperate with the GBC. This means that it is
        even more critical for the lines of governance to be made clear and the CPO and India
        CPO relationship to be made watertight.

v.      CPO decisions have not been made public and this has kept abuse and abusers hidden
        from public view. From what we can gather, this has been the case because ISKCON is
        concerned that perpetrators might sue the institution for slander. It does not appear that
        we have explored all avenues to find a workaround to keep our communities safe.

vi.     Schools do not appear to have the capacity internally to deal with child protection matters.
        The CPO/CPT is relied upon to fill this deficiency and that is completely unrealistic.

vii.    Leaders seem unwilling to accept the depth of cultural malaise. Individuals within child
        protection roles have been threatened, beaten, and forced out. Individuals previously
        identified, through internal investigations, to be child molesters have been allowed to
        feature as high-profile spokespersons for flagship projects such as TOVP, or to be employed
        in positions of significant influence. Governance structures are riddled with potential
        conflicts of interest that would potentially limit the level of independent challenge (for
        example, disciples being on the same board as their spiritual master) or are at risk of group
        think because there is a lack of genuinely independent governors. And so on.

viii.   The CPO office budget went from $160,000 in year 1998 to the current $10,000 in
        2022. ISKCON seems habituated to cycles of experiencing a child protection tragedy,
        followed by a spurt of child protection activity as a knee-jerk ‘mode of passion’ response,
        followed by a ‘mode of ignorance’ lull, until the next tragedy. There has been no
        systemic, cultural shift.




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3. Recommendations
i.   Governance and accountability. The remit of this inquiry is limited to schools but suffice
     to say that governance failures as related to schools is symptomatic of governance failures
     in the institution as a whole. We have limited our suggestions to how school governance
     can be developed and believe these principles could be tweaked to be made workable for
     most countries.

a.   The current CPO/CPT functions are overburdened due to a lack of capacity and
     funding. They are also conflicted by supporting all aspects of safeguarding and then also
     auditing schools. For schools and leaders to have faith in the CPO, it needs significant
     additional capacity and structured as a truly international entity with fully integrated
     regional and local representation. There needs to be a new and separate function
     established as a School Inspectorate. The CPO should have regional representation
     (e.g. India CPO), in line with previous GBC resolutions, and not separated out. The
     CPO can then report to the GBC on all schools, and to the Indian Bureau for schools
     in India, but all international regional CPOs should be managed and coordinated by
     the International CPO. The School Inspectorate should be established by the GBC,
     operating completely independently, and be endowed with certain powers. They must
     be comprised of experienced educationalists with substantial expertise in safeguarding in
     school settings. The School Inspectorate should source inspectors from a global pool and
     coordinate inspections internationally. This is elaborated on further below.

b.   Reports from the regional CPOs and International CPOs should include a dashboard
     stating key information, such as number of complaints, ongoing investigations, rulings,
     and so forth. Data for the individual school level should be shared with the school’s
     governance body.

c.   At school leadership and governance levels there must be a clear vision for child
     protection supported with appropriate policies and procedures, clear and measurable
     objectives and goals, appropriate levels of capability, competency, and energy to deliver
     on the objectives and goals, documented responsibilities for everyone with a clear
     assessment against their delivery. Leaders should be requested to step down at any level
     of the structure if they are not ‘on board’ with the vision for child protection or are
     undermining it by their words or actions.




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d.    There must not be any ‘shadow’ boards operating and ‘soft power’ must not be wielded
      (e.g. by initiating gurus, Bureau members, or GBC members) on that board. To help
      ensure that members of a governing body take their responsibilities seriously, if any
      member of the governing body of a school is found negligent in their duty to ensure
      safeguarding, they should be barred from holding any future leadership or managerial
      responsibilities connected to ISKCON.

e.    The regional CPO should appoint a safeguarding lead to each school’s governing body.

f.    The international CPO should have a victim support function established that can
      support victims in bringing credible cases against perpetrators or negligent leaders/
      managers. It might well be appropriate to fund this by charging the relevant negligent
      ISKCON authorities involved with the school to pay for costs, such as legal representation
      and advice, counselling, and further investigations.

g.    The School Principal should be the Designated Safeguarding Lead and not delegate this
      responsibility. This requirement can be removed with the permission of the new school
      inspection function if a school has proved itself to have excellent safeguarding practice.
      The principal can then delegate this role to another senior leader in the school though
      can never relinquish overall accountability for safeguarding.

h.    A departmental lead at GBC level should be appointed for child safety who holds direct
      accountability for ensuring oversight, funding, and implementation of all safeguarding
      related resolutions.

ii.   Regulation and scrutiny.

a.    The very best legal guidance must be sought urgently to implement measures that will
      allow for publication of information necessary for effective child protection. This could
      include ‘struck off’ or ‘barred’ lists, safeguarding investigative reports, and sanctions
      issued against individuals. This might be supported at employee level where contracts
      stipulate their acceptance of such powers.

b.    There must be genuinely independent, no-notice, annual safeguarding inspections.
      Safeguarding standards at these inspections must be met for a school to remain open,
      taking into consideration key areas such as levels of qualification, experience for leaders,
      educators, resources etc. These inspections may well trigger further school inspections if




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       the inspecting team feels necessary. These reports should be made publicly available in
       both English and the local language.

iii.   Culture and systems of recording and reporting.

a.     The GBC must insist on setting exemplary standards of transparency and integrity
       in responding to and supporting others to respond to cases when they occur. The
       GBC should set a culture where ‘nobody is above the law’ and insisting that their own
       members do not get involved with leadership, governance, or influence over a school
       unless they explicitly agree in writing to their liabilities in doing so (which should be
       personal and significant).

b.     Leaders should not be allowed to defend or promote individuals who have been judged to
       have been involved in child maltreatment, nor prioritise the reputation of the institution
       above the welfare of a child, as has been attempted (and of course failed) in the past. The
       GBC must receive training on the appropriate management of these issues and negative
       global impact on the institution in failing to put the interests of children first.

c.     Related to i(d), the GBC must work towards reducing bureaucracy that could obfuscate
       any investigation or implementation of any policy or resolution on the ground. There
       have been too many GBC resolutions that have been allowed to flounder at the expense
       of child welfare. The GBC should understand why that is the case and publish how they
       will remedy this.

d.     The GBC must ensure that their Whistle-blowing Policy and responses are adequate.

e.     Schools are community hubs, and it will almost always be the case that there is a blurred line
       between ‘community’ and ‘school’. This means that information sharing, and public-facing
       announcements or notices are of critical importance. This also includes clear guidance on
       how to whistle-blow and external bodies that can be contacted to report concerns.

f.     One of the most powerful ways to shift culture will be through training. There is appears
       to be an unacceptable deficit in what leaders understand about safeguarding. The CPO
       must deliver mandatory annual safeguarding training to all levels of school governance,
       from the GBC body down to individual school communities.




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4. Proposed Re-structure
The below proposed re-structure of safeguarding for ISKCON schools will go some significant
way to addressing the issues outlined above and the proposed recommendations:


                                                  School
CPO            Areas of Responsibility                             Areas of Responsibility
                                                  Inspectorate
International Team                                Trained education professionals with
                                                  internationally recognized safeguarding training
               Create safeguarding policies
               and procedures                                      Set criteria for training
               Implement cultural                                  Power to carry out no-notice
               recommendations                                     inspections, with a minimum
               Implement directives from                           of one per school per year
               School Inspectorate                                 Power to instruct closure of
               Maintain international                              school, with school able to
               barred/struck-off list                              appeal decision with GBC
               Victim support, including legal                     or IB
                                                                   Receive whistle-blowing
               Reports to GBC: failures in
               system, serious cases, concerns                     Power to carry out
               from Regional Teams                                 investigations
Regional Team                                                      Power to publish inspection
                                                                   reports in the public domain
               Support schools as point of
                                                                   (based on legal advice)
               escalation and investigation
               Provide training and CPD
               Carry out termly developmental
               school visits
School Team
               Ensure there is a designated
               local governor lead
               Implementing policies, including
               safer recruitment and training




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And at a school level:



School Governance               Areas of Responsibility

Members to at least include: To include at least:
2 elected parents               Performance management of Principal
1 principal                     Termly reporting to CPO Regional Team
1 appointed by CPO
(Regional Team)

Plus, up to 5 co-opted others

All members to be approved
by CPO International Team



5. Finance
We have not carried out a detailed analysis of what the financial cost of such a structure
would cost. As an estimate, we would suggest that the GBC should be willing to allocate
approximately US$10,000 per school per year assuming a minimum of 20 schools. For India
alone, we would estimate the cost at close to US$100,000 per year.

6. Conclusion
Running schools is serious business. When schools struggle with resources (financial, personnel
or other), safeguarding can suffer. Any school – new or existing – should be able to evidence
a clear approach to resource planning. This includes funding to secure the CPO and School
Inspectorate functions, in addition to insurances or other ‘sinking fund’ mechanisms to cover
victim support. This might come from the local ISKCON centre or leader that decides to
subsidise a school affiliated to ISKCON, or it might come from the school itself. Either way,
the GBC should set schools up for success and that means accepting the significant financial
and managerial resources burden that comes with that. If that is not possible, the GBC should
start the process of closing down ISKCON schools that cannot evidence set standards of
safeguarding excellence.




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Annex 1
FAO: ISKCON GBC
20th November 2022


Dear Members of the GBC,

Please accept my humble obeisances. All glories to Srila Prabhupada.

Hare Krishna.

I am the founding CEO of a group of UK government-supported schools that are based upon
the principles of Krishna consciousness, so child protection is naturally of paramount importance
to me. It is deeply troubling to see that within ISKCON, we still don’t seem to have our culture
right about this most important matter. I write the below with the intention to help move things
forward so that we – the members of ISKCON – can hand-on-heart say that we are doing
everything reasonably possible to ensure that child abuse is eradicated from our communities.

Recently, a case has been brought forward that will mean the Pope will defend himself in court
against allegations of covering up child abuse. This shows that the legal framework enables
someone to bring such proceedings against arguably the most powerful religious leader in the
world. We must ensure that victims and their families have the same recourse against ISKCON
leaders and school staff. If an ISKCON yatra decides that they will permit a school to operate
under its auspices or with their support, the local GBC, Temple President, gurus, sannyasis or any
other person exercising significant influence over that provision, must be held legally accountable.
We must not allow influence and power without corresponding accountability and responsibility.
Child protection is something many leaders simply do not wish to engage with – if that’s the case,
then either don’t get involved with a school (and if you are a TP or GBC, that means don’t have a
school under your jurisdiction) or simply step down and let someone else do the job.

Unfortunately, it seems that the only way leaders will take this responsibility seriously is if they
are held personally liable. If you are dealing with children, or you have a significant role in
enabling others to deal with children, you must be willing to put your neck on the line.

Clearly, there is no scenario that will guarantee that child abuse never happens in our institution.
However, the onus on leaders is of course to ensure that we have done everything within our power
to prevent it, and that if it does occur, we deal with it in the most honest and robust way possible.




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Effective governance and clear lines of accountability are essential components in enabling that
to be possible. Mandatory annual child protection audits should be commissioned for every
school. These audits should be carried out by professionals not associated with ISKCON and
their reports should be made public.

There is an obvious imperative to help victims and their families with spiritual, emotional, and
material support. There is also an imperative to provide both remedial and punitive measures
for the guilty. We are not yet experts in these matters within ISKCON and so the involvement
of external agencies will likely be beneficial in guiding our response in this regard. For serious
cases of abuse, including negligence, we should consider pursuing jail sentences. One element of
essential support required for victims is in helping to bring their case forward with confidence
that it will be dealt with fairly, that there will not be any repercussions for them from senior
figures within ISKCON or ‘friends’ of the accused, and that they will be practically supported
to navigate the respective police and court systems when bringing credible charges. ISKCON
must be able to honestly provide such support and assurances. If that needs to be funded
through a tax system in the negligent yatra, then so be it; a financial risk to local leaders will be
no bad thing.

Unless we have these three things: direct legal accountability for anyone significantly influencing
a school, annual child protection audits, and a well-resourced support system for victims, we
will see this happen again. And again.

There are many other aspects that also need to be addressed, such as school policies, staff and
student training, parent training, HR processes, curriculum etc. It is too much detail for the
purposes of this letter but suffice to say, for now, that there are several ISKCON-friendly
organisations that have the capacity to share best practice in these areas.

I recognise that the above level of accountability may be a step too far for some ISKCON
leaders. Unfortunately, the fact that individuals often lack the political or financial clout to hold
leaders to account has meant that too many ISKCON leaders have gotten away with severe
derogations of duty. The above proposals aim to redress that. However, if the GBC is unwilling
to make the necessary changes to adequately protect our children, it is inevitable that individual
members of ISKCON will have no choice but to establish an independent mechanism that will
force such a change – this will likely happen by offering privately funded and direct support to
victims in order to bring charges against ISKCON leaders who have perpetrated abuse or those
leaders who were informed of abuse but have turned a blind eye. It would be a real blemish




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on our Society if such a mechanism had to be forced upon ISKCON instead of ISKCON
embracing the required changes – but one way or another, it must be done.

Finally, given the systemic and repeated failures of child protection in ISKCON-run schools,
and if ISKCON leadership does not have the wherewithal to lead on genuine school
transformations and governance, the alternative would be for ISKCON to withdraw from
running schools. This would be especially true for boarding schools because of their highly
elevated child protection risks. As I write this, I have been made aware of ongoing peer-on-peer
sexual abuse at a residential school associated with ISKCON and where ISKCON leadership
seems to be yet again failing in their duty of care in addressing this problem. It is criminal to
allow this to continue. On behalf of several other concerned devotees, I offer you our practical
support to address this urgent matter and the associated institutional failures of leadership
and governance.


Your servant,
Navina Krsna das




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Annex 2
GBC Inquiry regarding Child Abuse at Sridham Mayapur and Vrindavan
Whereas, it has been brought to the attention of the GBC Body that there were lapses in
the implementation of sufficient child protection measures in the ISKCON Mayapur and
Vrindavan Schools;

Whereas, it is imperative to first identify, by way of an inquiry, the causes of such a lapse in the
current governance and system setup for child protection and, subsequently, to put in place
measures to avert such lapses from being repeated in the ISKCON Mayapur and Vrindavan schools;

Whereas, such an inquiry shall not preclude the formation or functioning of other committees
with respect to improving child protection within ISKCON;

Resolved: That the GBC conducts an inquiry to identify the lapses in the implementation of
child protection measures at ISKCON Mayapur and Vrindavan schools, details of which are set
out below as follows:

1.     Scope of enquiry:

1.1.   This inquiry will be limited to ISKCON schools with specific focus on examining the
       their current organisational structures and legal frameworks required for child protection
       and to assess the current risks in respect of the same.

1.2.   Identify the root causes of governance shortcomings in the ISKCON Mayapur gurukula
       by interviewing relevant members of the CPO, GBC Zonal Secretaries, Mayapur
       temple leadership, the current school leadership, and any other parties that may have
       been connected, directly or indirectly, to the ISKCON Mayapur Gurukula, review the
       documentation that governs the relationship between these entities and similarly review
       the governance arrangements and documentation for ISKCON Vrindavan gurukula.

1.3.   Ascertain whether the governance shortcomings identified above are likely to be
       replicated across other ISKCON school settings; this will likely include wider interviews
       and documentation review.

1.4.   Review the structural and legal relationship between the different layers of ISKCON
       with governance of schools and the CPO.




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1.5.   Ancillary to the above review will be the Inquiry’s access to and study of the CPO
       Guidelines as they relate to scope as outlined in items 1.1-1.4

2.     Desired Outcomes:

2.1.   Phase one shall entail collating the findings of the Inquiry and making specific written
       recommendations to the GBC Body in order to remedy the identified shortcomings and
       areas of improvement for implementation by relevant bodies; and

2.2.   Phase two will be supporting implementation of the adopted recommendations of
       the Inquiry.

2.2.1. Identifying qualified resources who could help implement the approved recommendations.

2.2.2. Commissioning mandatory annual child protection audits for every school. These audits
       should be carried out by professionals (with no conflict of interest) and their reports
       should be made public.

3.     Proposed team:

3.1.   Individuals with extensive school safeguarding and inspection experience will be
       appointed at the discretion of the inquiry coordinator.

3.2.   The Avanti Schools’ legal advisors are available for consultation where necessary

3.3.   Other volunteers for management, communication and administration to support this
       process will be recruited as needed;

3.4.   Navin Krishna Das will coordinate the inquiry;

3.5.   An optional committee from GBC and India Bureau can be created at the outset to help
       facilitate the inquiry.

4.     Funding: Navin Krishna Das has kindly agreed to raise the funding for the following:

4.1.   Team consultation fees

4.2.   Legal consultation fees

5.     Timeline: First phase report is to be presented to the GBC Body within 8 weeks after 		
       whatever preliminary information is requested by the team is provided to them




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6.    Action items: Upon approval of the GBC Body, the following actions need to be completed

a.    By and before 11th January 2023, GBC members on the India Bureau, headed by Gopal
      Krishna Maharaja, procure the India Bureau’s formal resolution and commitment to
      support the completion of this inquiry;

b.    By and before 18th January 2023, GBC Zonal secretaries (Jayapataka Swami, Gopal
      Krishna Goswami, Bhakti Purushottama Swami, Hrdaya Caitanya das and Anuttama
      das) and Indian Bureau representatives (Devakinandan das, Basu Ghosh das and
      Dayaram das) with authority over Mayapur must procure the Mayapur executive board
      (MEB) formal resolution and commitment to support the completion of this inquiry.

i.    MEB resolution should include assigning a dedicated co-director to arrange and assure
      cooperation from the Mayapur management structure for the timely completion of
      the inquiry;

ii.   The co-director should procure by 31st January 2023 the preliminary information stated
      below so that the formal inquiry can ensue.

c.    By and before 18th January 2023, GBC Zonal secretaries and Indian Bureau
      representatives with authority over Vrindavan must procure the Vrindavan executive board
      (VEB) formal resolution and commitment to support the completion of this inquiry.

i.    VEB resolution should include assigning the temple president to arrange and assure
      cooperation from the Mayapur management structure for the timely completion of
      the inquiry;

ii.   The temple president should procure by 31st January 2023 the preliminary information
      stated below so that the formal inquiry can ensue.




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Preliminary information
a. Provide a copy of all resolutions passed by the GBC body and local management with respect
   to child protection at these schools;

b. The existing CPO guidelines that needed to be adhered to at these centers;

c. Provide a copy of any scheme of delegation or legal or financial arrangement that connects
   the schools to ISKCON. This could be property leases, MOUs, management agreements,
   governing articles, and so on;

d. Provide a copy of the child protection, health and safety, whistleblowing, complaints,
   grievance policies that the school has adopted;

e. Provide a list of the names and contact details of the governors of the school and principal/
   head teacher;

f. Provide a copy of any scheme of delegation or legal framework that sets out the relationship
   between the international CPO to the GBC body.

g. Provide a copy of any scheme of delegation or legal framework that sets out the relationship
   between the local CPT to the GBC body and to the international CPO.

h. Who owns the land and buildings upon which the school operates?

i. What is the legal entity that owns the school? Please provide the governing documents for
   this entity (articles of association and memorandum, trust document etc.).

j. What is the legal entity that operates the school? (If different from the owner). Please provide
   the governing documents for this entity (articles of association and memorandum, trust
   document etc.).




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Annex 3
Usha Sahni BA PGCE MSc MA
Usha was a Senior Her Majesty’s Inspector for 14 Years and held posts as one of the three
Regional Directors, the Deputy Director for Early Years, and also responsible for Local
Education Authorities’ Annual Assessments that included Safeguarding and Education, Early
Years and Primary Education, and Social Care provision. She was previously Education Director
for Avanti Schools Trust. As a distinguished headteacher, she has served in many inner London
schools and has made a strong contribution to national initiatives in raising standards for
children from poorer backgrounds. Usha was a founding member of the National College for
School Leadership, and a Board member for the University of London Institute of Education.
Her experience includes leadership training and coaching for headteachers and teachers as a
mentor, an external examiner and an assessor of the National Professional Qualification for
Headship. Usha has an undergraduate degree in Psychology and a masters degree in Education
& Management. In 1999, she was awarded an OBE for her Services to Education.

Dr James Biddulph BA PGCE MA MEd PhD FCCT FRSA
James gained Advanced Skills Teachers (AST) status in creativity and in 2003 was awarded
Outstanding New Teacher of the Year for London. He is the inaugural Headteacher of the
University of Cambridge Primary School, the first primary University Training School in
the UK and is a founding fellow of the Chartered College of Teaching. James was founding
Principal of Avanti’s primary school in East London.




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